First, it is feared a temporary boost attacks against foreign targets. Over the past two years, extremists in Indonesia had indeed diverted from attacks against the West, often oriented symbolic places like the great American hotels and fast food chains in favor of operations or attempts operations against local targets, particularly the police. It was the direct result of anger antiterriroriste Detachment 88, responsible for the arrest and death of many mujahideen during the dismantling of a camp in Aceh in February 2010. But it also reflects the realization that the foreign targets have little interest in recruiting: for the majority of Indonesians kill foreign civilians to avenge the deaths of Muslims in Iraq or Gaza No ' was not much sense. However, bin Laden was a symbol so strong and revered by the extremists that the calculation of cost / benefit ratio could not be more important compared to the need to react in a visceral way or another to his death. Need that could also be strengthened by the countless images of jubilation in the U.S. broadcast television.
Second possible consequence, the attacks in retaliation. If this possibility is real, it is less simple than it seems. Designing an attack takes time: the threat for the next few days less than the coming months, if not years, which gives the police time to thwart these attacks. Indonesian extremists have also not really proven themselves in this area. In January 2007, police operations in Poso in central Sulawesi (or Sulawesi) had led to the death of 14 combatants within the movement, voices were raised to demand retaliation, but no group had had the capacity to respond. After the execution of the Bali bombers  in November 2008, huge demonstrations were accompanied their funerals, but despite strong concerns, no cons-attack has taken place. If this was obviously something reassuring, keep in mind that there are five or six nebulae potential terrorists - and remember it only takes one of these groups reaches its goals.
Third possibility, enhanced adhesion to Al Qaeda, both in ideology to the various branches of the network. A series of extremists in South-East trying to mount local branches of the terrorist organization, based more on common ideas on direct institutional ties. At the time of the second Bali bombing in 2005, Mr. Noordin Top had called his organization "Al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago." In 2009, after the attacks against hotels in Jakarta, he had changed the name to "Al-Qaeda to Southeast Asia," even as a Malaysian named Fadzullah Mohamad Abdul Razak, who was arrested had since claimed the same title a year earlier for a any other group that wished to send fighters to Malaysia in southern Thailand. In early 2010, coalitions extremists behind the creation of Camp Aceh were renamed "Al-Qaeda to the Veranda / Antechamber of Mecca," a nickname given to the province of Aceh.
There is no doubt that the ideology of Al-Qaida has not lost its resonance, so that the most worthy of the name jihadists continue to identify with it. And links are sometimes more practical. On January 25, Umar Patek was arrested in Abbottabad, the city where bin Laden lived - it was probably no coincidence (the arrest probably also formed part of the same transaction). The Indonesian authorities must now examine Patek, remained in detention in Pakistan, the exact nature of his contacts with Al Qaeda and the identity of those in Southeast Asia, actively cooperate with the network, it either in the field of propaganda, training or even organizing attacks. In his commitment to working with bin Laden, Umar Patek, a former member of Jemaah Islamiyah and co-organizer of the Bali bombings, comes in the wake of Hambali, Jemaah Islamiyah chief detained in Guantánamo and whose relations with Al-Qaida until his arrest in 2003 are detailed in a recent document revealed by Wikileaks.
Bin Laden's death could lead to stronger links between local organizations and Al-Qaeda propaganda and re-based imaging and arguments of the international terrorist network. Nothing leads us to believe that the death of the founder of Al-Qaida has improved one iota of safety in Indonesia. The only good news if one is necessary, is that none of the groups emerged in the last two years has demonstrated the technical capabilities that Noordin M. Top has deployed for devastating. But there is absolutely no reason to celebrate the end of terrorism in Indonesia.