FROM THE COINCIDENCE FILE:
By Ken Boyte
Three months before Sept. 11, 2001, the Bush administration changed the protocol for responding to commercial hijackings.
Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense under President George W. Bush, issued directive J-3 CJCSI 3610.01A to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 1, 2001.
Prior to Rumsfeld’s protocol change, some experts believe that the authority to shoot down a hijacked airplane was delegated by the president to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 9/11 Commission concluded that approval was needed from the president to shoot down the hijacked aircraft.
Rumsfeld’s position has been that the 2001 directive merely updated a 1997 directive by clarifying language relating to the protocol for responding to hijacked aircrafts.
Directive J-3 CJCSI 3610.01A—which Rumsfeld issued to the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff on June 1, 2001—states: “When notified that military escort aircraft are needed in conjunction with an aircraft piracy (hijacking) emergency, the DDO, NMCC, will notify the appropriate unified command or USELEMNORAD to determine if suitable aircraft are available and forward the request to the secretary of defense for approval in accordance with DODD 3025.15, paragraph D.7.”
The language “aircraft piracy” or “hijackings” is not included in the 1997 directive, which J-3 CJCSI 3610.01A replaced.
Compare section 4.5 of the directive 3025.15 issued Feb. 18, 1997: “With the exception of immediate responses under imminently serious conditions, as provided in subparagraph 4.7.1 below, any support that requires the deployment of forces or equipment assigned to a combatant command by secretary of defense memorandum, must be coordinated with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Saff. The chairman shall evaluate each request to use combatant command forces or equipment to determine if there is a significant issue requiring secretary of defense approval. Orders providing assistance to civil authorities that are approved by the secretary of defense involving the use of combatant command forces or equipment shall be issued through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Upon secretary of defense approval, the secretary of the army, when designated ‘the DoD Executive Agent,’ shall implement and oversee DoD support in accordance with such approval orders.”
Section 4.6 continues: “This Directive does not address non-Federalized National Guard assets in support of local and/or state civil agencies approved by the governor.”
Section 4.7.1: “Requests for an immediate response (i.e., any form of immediate action taken by a DoD component or military commander to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions) may be made to any component or command.”
Chain of Command
On Sept. 11, 2001, General Richard Myers was acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Henry Shelton, chairman, was out of the country. General Myers was promoted to chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff three days after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
According to Myers’ testimony before the 9/11 Commission on June 17, 2004, “The Chairman serves as the principal military advisor to the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense; and makes recommendations to Congress. The chairman’s responsibilities include strategic planning, contingency planning and readiness of the armed forces.
“Unified command roles are directed by Title 10 and the Unified Command Plan. Each of the combatant commander’s chain of command runs through the secretary of defense to the President. Several other documents outlined the armed forces’ roles and responsibilities in combating terrorism: The National Security Strategy for a Global Age (2000), Presidential Decision Directives 39 (1995) and 62 (1998), and the National Military Strategy (1997)."
Regardless of the motives behind Rumsfeld's protocol change on June 1, 2001—which specifically states that the secretary of defense must approve the shooting down of hijacked airplanes—the secretary of defense could not be found the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, from the time the hijackings began until the last airplane had crashed.
The Los Angles Times reported on Aug. 13, 2004: “Rumsfeld was missing in action that morning, 'out of the loop' by his own admission. For more than two hours after the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) became aware that the first plane had been violently overtaken by Middle Eastern men, the man whose job it was to order air cover over Washington did not show up in the Pentagon's command center. It took him almost two hours to 'gain situational awareness,' he told the commission. He didn't speak to the vice president until 10:39 a.m., according to the report. Since that was more than 30 minutes after the last hijacked plane crashed, it would seem to be an admission of dereliction of duty.”
According to the official conclusion of the 9/11 Commission, Dick Cheney, vice president under Bush, did not authorize NORAD jetfighters to shoot down the hijacked airplanes until after the last aircraft crashed into the Pentagon.
The final report of the 9/11 Commission does not reference the protocol change for responding to hijackings that Rumsfeld issued on June 1, 2001.
The Bush administration repeatedly blocked the investigation into the events of Sept. 11, 2001, according to CNN News and The New York Times.
No one in the Bush administration has ever been held accountable for the breakdowns of 9/11. Instead, people got promoted.
© Copyright 2010 by Ken Boyte
All rights reserved.
READ MY NOVEL ON ALL VOICES @
Sources:
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http://archives.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS
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Project for the New American Century Corporation (Sept. 2000). “International Relations in the Age of Empire: Rebuilding America’s Defenses.” Washington, D.C.
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http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/c
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