Making sense of the Afghan nonsense

In late June Commander of the US Forces in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal was ordered to give an initial assessment of the war in Afghanistan.

On August 30, 2009 General McChrystal submitted his 66-page assessment. In that report General McChrystal states, “The situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted. Although considerable effort and sacrifice have resulted in some progress, many indicators suggest the overall situation is deteriorating. We face not only a resilient and growing insurgency; there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans—that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Further, a perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents. Success is achievable, but it will not be attained by trying harder or ‘doubling down’ on the previous strategy. Additional resources are required, but focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely. The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.”

General McChrystal goes on to describe the “redefining of the fight” as conducting a “classic counterinsurgency operations in an environment that is uniquely complex… Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign.” The General continues by saying, “Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. In the struggle to gain the support of the people, every action we take must enable this effort.”

Consider what General McChyrstal is saying. “Our objective must be the population…every action we take must enable this effort.”

It has been stated that perception is the cruelest form of reality. If this is true, then what do you think the people of Afghanistan must think about America based on the inaction of our government over the past two-months? Is it possible that we are sending a signal that winning isn’t on the agenda? One retired General was stated as saying that the perception is that support for the war is waning. Is this helping or hurting our men and women in harms way?

It has also been reported that President Obama is considering a “scaled down” version to General McChrystal’s recommendation sending only 15,000 troups. It is reported that his strategy is to “draw back” into the cities leaving the outlying areas unprotected in an effort to draw the enemy to them.

Given the assessment General McChrystal offered regarding winning the support of the population and conducting a classic counterinsurgency operation, does it make any sense to even consider, much less suggest, such a strategy?

Last week the President made the statement to a group of Naval officers in Florida that he would not send them into harms way without weighing all the options—commendable to be sure. But why would your considerations be those that would not nor could not attain the objective as laid out by the man on the ground, General McChrystal?

The nonsense of the Afghan war is that lack of movement on the Administration’s part has none nothing to attain or even move closer to General McChrystal’s recommendation. The sad sense is that more of our brave young men and women have lost their lives while waiting for a Cavalry to arrive that might look more like a battalion.

God bless our troops.