The Colombianization of Mexico: Waging a violent Drug War

The scenes of carnage mirror those played out on the streets of Baghdad – severed heads and decapitated bodies deliberately placed adjacent to elementary school buildings; grisly videos of homicide uploaded for the world to see on the internet; innocent civilians increasingly caught in the cross fire of power and greed; tales of police whose dubious loyalties undermine efforts to marginalize the enemies while alienating the trust of the civil society they represent. These happenings are increasingly becoming a reality of Mexican life as it gradually becomes more evident that the epicenter of the ‘War on Drugs’ has shifted towards the country. The longer this conflict escalates and plays out, the more vulnerable Mexico is to descend into a maelstrom of violence, corruption, and despair.

The Rise of the Mexican Cartels

Mexico’s role in the drug trade has historically been as a transit to the world’s biggest drug market - the United States. According to the U.S. Drug and Enforcement Administration, as much as 90% of cocaine on its way to the U.S. passes through Mexico. The ‘War on Drugs’ originated by focusing on eradicating illegal drugs in principal drug-source countries in the Western Hemisphere- mainly Peru, Bolivia, and, in particular, Colombia. In the context of Colombia, the ‘War on Drugs’ was launched by the United States with the prime motivation to weaken anti-American, left-wing insurgent groups who used the drug trade to finance their armed struggle against the Colombian government. As Colombia was consumed by violence and instability, Mexico’s cartels played a secondary role in the drug trade as they were neither key producers nor consumers.

But following the weakening of Colombia’s Cali and Medellin cartels in the 1990s, the Mexican cartels usurped the main cocaine routes. Their powers over Mexican society strengthened as Mexico’s attorney general Eduardo Medina Mora has warned that the country “is no longer only a country of drug transit to the United States, but has become an important consumer market.”1 A corresponding federal investigation documented that “national drug consumption had risen by around 30% between 2002 and 2008, and almost 100% for cocaine.”2 Today, the National Drug Intelligence Center considers Mexican cartels “as dominating the U.S. illicit drug market”, even more than the Colombian producers. While lacking the Anti-Americanism that fueled the Colombian drug trade, the trend in Mexico is equally, if not more, alarming for Americans in several respects.

But ultimately this is Mexico’s dilemma. Problems have been exacerbated in recent years because of its own government whose branches have been both victims and perpetrators in the escalating violence with drug gangs. The distrustful nature that defines the relationship between government and civil society is worthy of focus when investigating the impact the current drug violence has on Mexican development.

One school of thought to explain the sudden increase in drug violence was that for 70 years, the Institutional Revolutionary Party ruled the country and turned a blind eye to the drug trade – “often taking a cut,” adds Deborah Bonello, editor and creator of MexicoReporter.com whose staff is based in Mexico City and has been documenting the current troubles. As the power vacuum was created in the drug wars by the collapse of various Colombian drug cartels, the Mexican cartels battled to take the prized transits by the American border. Violent gang warfare between cartels began disrupting civilian life. In a country with little opportunity in employment and ridden by inequality, profitable crime is a viable option. In a BBC World Service Poll conducted in November 2008, 42% of respondents in seven cities “attributed the boom in the drug cartels to unemployment and the poor state of the economy.”3 The World Bank notes that “in 2002, half the population in Mexico was living in poverty and one fifth was living in extreme poverty” having a wealth gap among the highest in the world 4

However, the escalation in violence in Mexico has differed from the drug violence in Colombia in two noticeable ways: First, “in Colombia, the general population was fair game [in the drug violence],” Bonello asserts. “In Mexico, largely speaking, the violence is restricted to conflict between the drug dealing gangs and armed forces.” Secondly, the drug war was and continues to remain largely restricted to only certain parts of Mexico –chiefly northern states, such as Chihuahua, but also Baja California, Sinaloa, Guerrero, and Michoacan. It is not a free-for-all on the scale of Colombia. However, the grave concern remains that it may spread. In August 2008, Yucatán, a major tourist destination that had avoided drug-related violence, saw the gruesome decapitation of 11 men linked to the drug trade.

A stand for the rule of law - supposedly

As the violence continued to escalate in 2006, newly-elected President Felipe Caldéron swore to upset the government’s long-established negligence toward drug violence. Despite a massive state crackdown launched two years ago, which included the deployment of some 36,000 soldiers across the country and an attempt by Mr. Caldéron to clean up the corrupt federal police force, it has produced mixed results. Concerning mortalities, 2007 saw 2,700 drug-violence related deaths – a record high. In 2008, 5,612 people were executed in Mexico’s drug war. To put it into perspective, observers have said the death rate in these parts of Mexico is comparable to present-day Iraq. “As the government’s public security office have recorded 443 drug-related murders across the country in July, NGO Iraq Body Count noted 669 civilian deaths in June.”5 As far as brutality and the effect fear plays into the lives of average Mexican and Iraqis, they are terribly similar. In 2008, there have been many horrifying examples demonstrating the extent death and fear perpetrated by gangs has infected Mexican society:

· On August 23, 2008, in Ciudad Jarez in the Chihuahua state, less than 24 hours after replacing his slain predecessor, police chief Jesus Blanco Cano was found blindfolded with his hands tied behind his back at a ranch. The rest of the 20-member police force quit in fear, forcing the Mexican military to take over. He was not the first officer to be assassinated in his first day either.

· On September 29, 2008, 12 tortured, tongueless bodies believed to be members of rival drug gangs were found near a playground outside a Primary School in Tijuana. 6

· On May 8, 2008, Commissioner Édgar Millán Gómez, the acting chief of the federal police, was found dead with eight bullets in his chest. The suspects were among his own officers who had connections with drug cartels. 7

· In a message to a police force in Culiacan, a boy in his early teens rode a bicycle in front of the station blasting a tune that was an ode to Edgar Guzman, the son of a local drug kingpin who was killed by a rival drug gang in a shootout May 10th demonstrating their tactics of intimidation and capability of operating in openness without fear of reprisal. 8

· In the first two weeks of October 2008, 400 people were killed. The killings “include six people lined up and shot against a wall with a written warning promising a similar fate to all “rats”, and five others shot dead in a house where a gang lord’s corpse was found in a freezer.” 9

· On November 2nd, one of Mexico’s most senior police officers, the acting Federal police commissioner, Victor Gerardo Garay, resigned after he was accused of working for a leading drug cartel by allowing the cartel to smuggle drugs through Mexico City’s international airport. That weekend, unrelated, 11 policemen were gunned down in the state of Michoacan and 11 more shot the following weekend in Tijuana, including a teenage girl. 10

A society divided

The drug violence brings to the forefront a triangular element to Mexican society: the drug industry, the government, and civil society. All are intertwined, yet are worlds apart. Reforming the police force is an ambitious task with its notorious corruption and often being in league – as the Victor Garay case demonstrates – with the drug gangs. Why is civil society expected to trust the police force to protect them when a significant number is working for the people that are threatening their stability with violence? Supporters of Caldéron have emphasized that the violent backlash by drug cartels is evidence of the success of his policies. Unquestionably, there have been some successes. The attempts of reforming police forces through firings and reshufflings– however limited their impact – are signs of the seriousness to confront the problem by acknowledging the problem is as entrenched within the Mexican government as it is outside. Furthermore, on October 26, 2008, Mexican soldiers arrested Eduardo Arellano Felix after a shootout. Eduardo was a leader of a Tijuana-based Arellano Felix cartel which remains a powerful cartel across from U.S border of San Diego. Popular criticism is that the drug cartels are designed to fill the vacuum – that it is unimportant who is taken out as the cartels will regroup. Still, capturing heads of cartels is invaluable for information.

While there is merit to such sentiment, those ideals are compromised by the contradictions in reality. Reporters without Borders have called Mexico the deadliest country for journalists in the Americas. Signs indicate that civilians are now being increasingly dragged into the violence between government forces and drug cartels. A key example occurred on September 15th when, during an Independence celebration in Moreila, two grenades were thrown into a crowd killing eight and wounding more than 100. The Los Zetas drug cartel was accused of orchestrating it and three of its members were subsequently arrested. “Innocents have been caught in the cross fire when family parties have been attacked by drug gangs. Civilians have also been targeted as a warning to the public not to denounce the narco gangs,” Bonello adds. The kidnapping and murder of a 14 year old, the son of a wealthy family that co-owns Mexico’s largest chain of sports stores, even after reportedly paying the ransom in Mexico City during August 2008 shocked the nation. More horrifyingly, a number of police officers were arrested in connection with the case. Kidnappings have long been a staple in Mexican crime but they have become increasingly violent and random, such as the November kidnapping of a five year old boy of a low-earning family in Mexico City who was killed by his kidnappers by injecting acid into his heart. Caldéron argues that drug gangs had turned to kidnapping to supplement their incomes after having come down on them – another affirmation to his unswerving belief that things were expected to get worse before they improved. Though the role of drug cartels in the kidnapping was never confirmed, the aura of fear that drug-cartels were now resorting to kidnappings - represented by police officers no less - shocked the Mexican population. In addition to creating a lawless and violent society, Mexico’s finance minister Agustin Carstens has said that crime and violence have had a significant impact on the country’s economy. The violence, kidnappings, and instability have stopped companies from investing and the need for security has increased business costs. Consequently, in regions that require the greatest investments, they are being failed because they are regions where the drug trade is strongest.

As the troubles have gotten increasingly deadly, America has realized its own required role to directly assist Mexico. An example is the Merida Initiative signed into law June 30, 2008 that approves $465 million in aid for Mexico and Central America to defeat drug cartels by funding training of law enforcement and inspection equipment. Critics have argued of the ineffectiveness of such proposals. Bonello is among the critics. “The Merida Initative was recently signed but the funds have yet to materialize,” she reports. “Frankly, even if they do, $400 million is a pittance and will have little or no impact on the capacity of the Mexican authorities to confront the drug gangs. The bill has come under fire with many claiming that it just puts more money into the hands of corrupt officials.” The efforts to curb drug violence in Mexico will unquestionably require measures from the United States. It is their demand that is driving the market.

Steps for the Future

The Mexican population is fed up. Massive protests and rallies have been held across the nation with a fierce urgency to improve the situation. Caldéron’s present strategy has seen mixed results: though the increased body count and increased paranoia tips the scale towards the negative, unquestionably his policies have shaken the status quo. How does Caldéron approach this crisis? First, he could stay the course. The increase in violence may be just the initial setback of drug cartel’s backlash to a more aggressive police force. Unfortunately, there is no indication that there is any letting up in the foreseeable future. The risk of staying the course is that the agenda becomes narrow for Mexico and resources will continue to be centralized to fight this battle instead of encouraging closing Mexico’s wealth gap and its development. In the aforementioned BBC survey, 68% of Mexicans agreed with the policy of involving the military in the fight against drug trafficking. Simultaneously, 80% believed the government should consider seeking other alternatives to end the problem. 11 But what are the alternatives? Considering the scope and complexities of the problem, extreme circumstances may require extreme reactions. One possibility that has been suggested is legalizing drugs. Organizations such as the Washington DC-based Stop the Drug War advocate such moves. “Stringency with regard to drug trafficking is a fruitless enterprise, because supply simply fills demand,” David Borden, Executive Director of Stop the Drug War claims. “Caldéron's attempt to crack down on trafficking organizations provides a grim illustration of how fighting that fight can lead to violence but without reducing the drug supply.” 12 There remains some maneuvering space in regards to the degree of legalization: A Swiss liberal model would provide recovering addicts with increasingly smaller doses of their drug of addiction while remaining tough on drug trafficking. “The success of heroin maintenance in reducing crime and improving the lives of addicts, in Switzerland and elsewhere, demonstrates a second benefit legalization will have -- reduction of the harm that drugs do to the people who use them despite the laws,” adds Borden. Any degree of legalization would force the price of drugs to drop and ruin the lucrative incentives for cartels. “It’s important to remember,” Deborah Bonello emphasizes, “that this conflict is not about ideology – it’s about business. And until something is done to tackle the demand for drugs or bring the trade into the legal realm. This will continue to be a big business and the drug gangs will continue to do what they have to do to protect it.” 13 An essential component of legalization is that the United States, as the biggest market, would have to adapt them too. The apprehension in doing so is the gamble of what cannot be forecasted.

There are no quick solutions to the problem. Mexico’s future is bleak – for rich and poor alike- if the violence continues and begins to spread to other cities. With increased Mexican drug consumption, it is most definitely within the realm of possibility that drug cartels may establish themselves in new markets in Mexico. Meanwhile, the Mexican population waits with hopes that the welfare of the nation gets better before it gets worse.

SOURCES:

1,2,9 Agence France Presse, “Mexico drug wars kill nearly 400 in two weeks,” October 18, 2008. Available at:

http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5j3cm95LQ5VJT2cj9XAHl--4XHEPw 3,5, ,11 Painter, James. “Mexicans drug trade fears grow,” BBC News. September 22,

2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7625195.stm>. 4 “Poverty in Mexico- Fact Sheet,” The World Bank. Available at http://go.worldbank.org/MDXERW23U0. 6 Lacey, Marc. “Drug Killings Haunt Mexican Schoolchildren,” New York Times,

October 19, 2008 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/20/world/americas/20tijuana.htm>l. 7 McKinley Jr, James C. “Mexico’s War on Drugs Kills its Police,” New York Times,

May 26, 2008.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/26/world/americas/26mexico.html>. 8 Whitbeck, Harris. "Mexican drug cartel trots out boy as warning to cops." CNN News. 27 May 2008.

<http://www.cnn.com/2008/world/americas/05/26/btsc.mexico.drugs/index.html>;.

10 "Top Mexico police officer resigns." BBC News. 2 Nov. 2008.

<http://http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7704654.stm.>.

12 Borden, David. “Stop the Drug War.” E-mail interview. 17 Nov. 2008.

13 Bonello, Deborah. "Mexico Reporter." E-mail interview. 16 Nov. 2008.