Iran's arrest and extradition to Saudi Arabia of 16 suspected members of al-Qaeda illustrates that, in addition to their expanding political and economic relations, security ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia are also growing.

The Iran's arrest and extradition to Saudi Arabia of 16 suspected members of al-Qaeda illustrates that, in addition to their expanding political and economic relations, security ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia are also growing.

This is despite Washington's efforts to isolate Iran and to prevent its influence in many regions, particularly in the strategically important oil-rich Persian Gulf, where Iran and Saudi Arabia act as regional powers.

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have gone through several phases over the past two decades. The 1979 Iranian revolution ended decades of friendly ties between the two Persian Gulf countries. Tehran's revolutionary regime accused the Saudis of corruption and of acting as an "American puppet" with which it could not have friendly relations. For its turn, the Saudi government accused its Iranian counterpart of seeking to destabilize the Saudi political system through its "export-of-revolution" policy.

The Iran-Iraq war worsened Saudi-Iranian relations in the 1980s. Saudi Arabia took sides with Iraq and availed to the Iraqi government its gigantic financial capability and its impressive influence in the Arab world and elsewhere. The Saudi pro-Iraqi policy made it Iran's number one enemy in the Persian Gulf. Although the war ended in 1988, the Saudis kept that status, a result of Iran's heavy losses in human lives and massive destruction of its industries and infrastructure during the eight-year war. In such a situation, the Saudis' fear of Iranian-backed efforts to topple their regime kept their mistrust and hostility towards the Iranians alive.

Saudi-Iranian ties began to improve only after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its subsequent 1991 Persian Gulf war. Iran's taking sides with the Kuwaitis and the anti-Iraqi coalition of the Arab Persian Gulf states helped put Iran's ties with its southern Arab neighbors on a friendly path. In particular, Saudi-Iranian relations, especially their diplomatic ones, began to improve, as reflected by exchanges of high-ranking delegates between the two countries in the 1990s, even though various remaining grievances on both sides prevented their rapid expansion.

The 1997 election of Mohammad KhatamiMohammad Khatami as Iranian president acted as a catalyst in Iranian-Saudi relations. His pursuit of a foreign policy aimed at tension reduction and improving ties with foreign countries paved the way for a rapid expansion of ties between Iran and its southern Arab neighbours. In particular, that policy put Iranian-Saudi relations on a stable and friendly path. Their bilateral relations encompassing various fields, such as political, economic, educational and security, have since grown on a steady basis. Their well-coordinated policies within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries over issues such as oil pricing and production quotas for the member states have clearly reflected the depth of their closeness.

A major indicator of warming relations between the two former foes has been their cooperation on security affairs, including regional security. As the largest and the richest Persian Gulf countries with certain influence, Iran and Saudi Arabia have the capabilities to affect the pace of events in their region. Thus their cooperation is a necessity for ensuring security in the region, which contains over 60 percent of the world's proven oil reserves in addition to a phenomenal amount of gas (Iran and Qatar have the world's second and the third largest gas deposits, respectively). Growing Iranian-Saudi relations and efforts towards regional security have promoted Iraq to express concern about what it describes as their "anti-Iraqi coalition".

Iran and Saudi Arabia have signed a few security agreements since 1997, including one in April 2002 during the official visit to Iran of Saudi Minister of the Interior Amir Nayef bin Abdulaziz. In the absence of any official statements by the two signatories on the specifics of such agreements, there is little doubt, if any at all, that they should include their cooperation towards the elimination of extremist and terrorist organizations endangering their stability, among other objectives. Against this background, the release of information by Saudi Foreign Minister Amir Saud al-Faisal on Iran's handing over of suspected al-Qadea members to the Saudi authorities should not surprise anyone.

Apart from its assumed obligations under the security agreements, Iran has every reason to seek to eliminate the remnants of the anti-Iranian Taliban and all Afghanistan-based groups under its protection, including al-Qaeda. They all helped the Taliban remain in power through a variety of means, including by taking part in the Taliban's atrocities in Afghanistan. As the main supporter of the Northern Alliance (along with Russia), Iran welcomed the Taliban's fall from power. Undoubtedly, Iran has no reason to take a chance on the reemergence of the Taliban or any like-minded regime.

Uprooting the Taliban and their supporters, such as al-Qaeda, is a necessary step towards that objective. As well, the latter also serves the Iranian objectives of security in the Persian Gulf shared by the Saudis and of improving ties with Arab countries. As mentioned by Saud, such objectives have motivated the Iranians to extradite since February 100 Arab nationals who crossed into Iran from Afghanistan to their respective countries - that is Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Saudi-Iranian cooperation is not a new development and thus its continuation is perfectly understandable within the context of relations between the two largest nations on the northern and southern shores of the Persian Gulf. However, the expansion of such relations at a time when the American governments is seeking Iran's isolation indicates the determination of the largest regional ally of the United states, Saudi Arabia, to pursue its own regional interests. And apparently, these interests do not necessarily wholly coincide with those of the United States.