ISLAMIC WORLDS nuclear program

Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was established in 1972 by Zulfiqar AliZulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who founded the program while he was Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and later became President and Prime Minister. Shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war with India, Bhutto initiated the program with a meeting of physicists and engineers at Multan in January 1972.

India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" gave Pakistan's nuclear program new momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.

In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987.

SYRIA NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

When the facts change,
I change my mind.
What do you do, sir?
John MaynardJohn Maynard Keynes

"The wicked flee when no man pursueth:
but the righteous are bold as a lion."
Proverbs 28:1

It appears that the Syrian nuclear program came as a surprise to both the Israelis and the Americans. Neither had previously acted or spoken as though Syria had nuclear ambitions, and both acted awfully peculiar after the air strike. This would explain Israeli silence, namely that Syria had been working on it for years and the Israelis had not noticed until very recently. It would also explain the complete incoherence of the US leakint in the weeks after the event. If the US had already had a file on the place, the place name would have come out pretty fast, along with a coherent explanation for what it was, but this was not the case. The sequence of events in the news coverage suggests that the US took the better part of September and October to figure out what was going on and figure out how they missed it.

Syria is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Syria has a standard safeguards agreement with the IAEA but, like Iran, has not yet signed or even begun negotiations on the IAEA Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol is an important tool that, if fully implemented, could strengthen the IAEA's investigative powers to verify compliance with NPT safeguards obligations and provides the IAEA with the ability to act quickly on any indicators of undeclared nuclear materials, facilities and activities. Syria has called for an area free of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Although Syria has long been cited as posing a nuclear proliferation risk, prior to 2007 the country seems to have been too strapped for cash to get far. Syria allegedly began a military nuclear program in 1979 and had not provided the IAEA with full information on all its nuclear activities. Syria had claimed that it was interested in nuclear research for medical rather than military purposes, but Israel and the United States have opposed sales of a reactor to Syria on the grounds that it would serve as an important step toward the building of a nuclear weapon.

The United States was concerned about Syria's nuclear R&D [research and development] program and continues to watch for any signs of nuclear weapons activity or foreign assistance that could facilitate a Syrian nuclear weapons capability. Syrian has made efforts to acquire dual-use technologies -- some, through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Technical Cooperation program -- could be applied to a nuclear weapons program.

In a speech to the Heritage Foundation on May 6, 2002, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton grouped Syria with Libya and Cuba as rogue states that support international terrorism and are pursuing the development of mass destruction weapons (WMD). On October 9, 2002, Undersecretary Bolton told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “[w]e remain very concerned that nuclear and missile programs of Iran and others, including Syria, continue to receive the benefits of Russian technology and expertise.” The allusion to nuclear programs prompted a complaint from the Syrian Foreign Ministry, which averred that Syria has been calling for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East since 1987.

As of July 2003, the authoritative Nuclear Threat Initiative website stated that "Overall, Syria is a country with limited nuclear resources and capabilities. Most of these are focused on research and development and the practical application of radioisotopes for use in industry. It is unclear how many nuclear facilities Syria actually has, but they all appear to be meant for the purpose of advancing the cause of nuclear science and industry in that country..... Although there are some areas of uncertainty surrounding Syria's nuclear program, the program appears to be rudimentary at best and focused on civilian and scientific applications."

A 2004 study for the Swedish Defense Ministry" concluded "In regards to nuclear capacity, all available information indicates that Syria today focuses its nuclear ambitions in the civil sector. Syria does not have any military nuclear program ambitions, and the lack of economical and technical resources needed for such a program are vital arguments behind this conclusion."

At the 11 January 2007 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States Statement for the Record of Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, U.S. Army Director, Defense Intelligence Agency mentions Syria in fourteen instances, but makes no mention of concerns about Syrian nuclear activities, saying instead that "Syria has pursued development of a strategic deterrent principally based on ballistic missile, chemical, and, to a limited extent, biological warfare programs, as a m eans of countering Israel‘s conventional force superiority. ..."

Under an IAEA project, first approved in 1984 and completed in 1991, six IAEA missions were sent to Syria to advise the counterparts on site selection. The Agency's assistance on site selection was accelerated during Syria's negotiations with USSR suppliers for a 10 MW reactor, but the negotiations later broke down. After intensive historical, earthquake and geological studies, three potential sites were identified near Damascus and one of them was selected for the Miniature Neutron Source Research [MNSR] Reactor project. A training course on research reactor utilization was organized in Poland for 10 Syrian scientists. All objectives of the project were incorporated into IAEA Project SYR/4/004, under which a miniature neutron source reactor was procured.

The Argentine Council for International Affairs [CARI] reports that "In May of 1989, the General Director of the Atomic Energy Committee of Syria visited Bariloche, Argentina in order to initiate negotiations for the purchase of a complete atomic center. Syria had already received a Russian bid for a 10 MW reactor, with adequate financing. Nevertheless, in October a bid was submitted for a nuclear center built around a small research reactor of 1 to 3 MW. A year later, in October of 1990, an extended bid was prepared. The proposed nuclear center would be located in Homs; its size would be 150 to 200,000 square feet, and it would have departments of biology, physics, geology, agriculture and auxiliary services... The amount of the contingent contract would exceed US$ 250 million.... By the end of 1991 ... these negotiations, which were quite advanced, were halted... in August of 1995, after the Argentinean President’s visit to Syria, contacts were renewed. The Syrian nuclear organization submitted an order for a 5 to 10 MW research reactor, a waste treatment plant and a radioisotope production plant. A letter of intent to commence within 24 months was signed. INVAP would be the supplier and the contract was to be signed in August of 1997, but this never took place. At the end of 1996, Syria purchased cobalt-therapy equipment, through an international bid, for a price of US$ 300,000."

In 1991, China reported to the IAEA the potential sale of a 30 KW research reactor to Syria. The IAEA blocked the sale and Syria subsequently reduced its nuclear activities.

Under IAEA Project SYR/4/004, completed 25 May 1998, the Agency assisted the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission to purchase and install a Chinese 30 kW miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR) at Dayr Al Hajar [Der Al-Hadjar]. The project was funded from the TCF and through a GCS contribution from the counterpart. Extensive expert services and training enabled the counterpart staff to acquire knowledge and expertise in evaluating the seismicity of the reactor site, in licensing research reactors and operators, in preparing and reviewing the Safety Analysis Report, in operating and utilizing the reactor, in developing an irradiation facility and an R&D programme, in establishing radiation protection measures and in carrying out the safety analysis of the MNSR. As a result of the project, "Syria MNSR" has been installed in Der Al-Hadjar Nuclear Research Centre near Damascus and is fully operational. A local capability has been established to use the reactor as a source of neutrons for NAA, for the limited production of short lived radioisotopes and for training staff and students.

In 1997, it was reported that the Russian government was interested in selling a nuclear reactor to Syria. On 23 February 1998, Syria and Russia signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In July 1998, the two sides agreed on the time table for the realization of a 25-MW light-water nuclear research center project in Syria with the participation of Russia's Atomstroyeksport and Nikiet. In addition, Russia and Syria have approved a draft program on cooperation on civil nuclear power. Broader access to Russian expertise could provide opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities, should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons. According to a London Financial Times report on January 16, 2003, Russian government sources indicated that Russia was negotiating to build a nuclear power plant in Syria, but Syrian officials said they could neither confirm nor deny the report.

Syria said its air defences opened fire on Israeli warplanes flying over the northeast of the country in the early hours of Thursday 06 September 2007. Very few facts are known about the alleged incident. On 12 September 2007 Mark Mazzetti and Helene Cooper in The New York Times reported that "Officials in Washington said that the most likely targets of the raid were weapons caches that Israel’s government believes Iran has been sending the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah through Syria." On 13 September 2007 Glenn Kessler reported in the Washington Post that " ... a former Israeli official...