Worst Chaos in Ahmadenijad's troubled kingdom:What will happen?

Iran is confronting its worst crisis since the Shah was ousted some 30 years ago. The current upheaval has brought Mir Hosain Mousavi, who lost the election to President Mahmoud AhmadinejadMahmoud Ahmadinejad, to the fore, but he has for too long been an ‘insider’ to claim leadership of the protest movement.

Moreover, the upheaval is spearheaded by the affluent, liberal, urban elite that is dissatisfied with the rhetoric justifying economic deprivation and political controls. The regime’s legitimacy has been shattered, though it is not yet under threat of collapse, thanks to support in the countryside — and its willingness to use repressive measures.

More importantly, the demonstrations have broken the taboo on public criticism of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. His hasty endorsement of Ahmadinejad’s election turned him into a partisan figure.

It is possible that the regime may not be as unpopular as claimed by the West. But the protests are a powerful expression of the alienation of the urban young, born after the Islamic Revolution with no memories of the Shah’s dictatorial regime. They are demanding greater freedom and a less suffocating system. Since all levers of power are controlled by the regime, the space for alternative politics does not exist for them.

With Iran’s top legislative body, the Guardian Council, having confirmed that it failed to find major violations, the die appears to have been cast. The lines are now drawn and confrontation inevitable. The 12-member Council’s statement leaves little scope for fresh legal challenges, except to mount an attack on Ayatollah Khamenei who has stood firmly by Ahmadinejad.

The battle now moves to the Assembly of Experts, chaired by former President Rafsanjani, a Mousavi ally. The assembly has the constitutional power to depose the Supreme Leader. This is a step never contemplated before and likely to lead to fratricidal war unless the various lobbies within the power structure are able to sink their differences.

It is, however, the US that has the biggest stake in what happens in Iran. It was after all President Obama’s initiative on Iran that was to be the test case for the success of his policy of ‘dialogue and engagement’ with former enemies. This had aroused tremendous opposition from within his own party, but Obama refused to deviate from his stand that Iran was far too important to be ostracised.

However, as news of killings continued to trickle in, he warned that ‘no iron fist is strong enough to shut off the world from bearing witness to the peaceful pursuit of justice’. He candidly explained his strategy: deplore the actions of the regime without becoming a ‘foil for the Iran government’ that wanted to ‘blame what is happening on the streets of Tehran on the CIA and the White House’.

Under intense domestic pressure, he declared that he was ‘appalled and outraged’ by the security crackdown in Iran. The British had no such consideration, which explains their eagerness to wade into the imbroglio with abandon.

Should this spat become a major confrontation, both sides will be the losers, as they desperately need to resolve their differences and cooperate on issues that are of immense importance to them.

The most critical of these is Iran’s nuclear programme. There can be no resolution of this until both sides are prepared to show flexibility and imagination. This is possible only in a dialogue.

No less important is Iran’s ability to influence the course of events in Iraq and Afghanistan where Iran could either play the kind of role that would ease American worries or make life difficult for Washington. Finally, Iran’s cooperation with Syria, its support for Hezbollah and its solidarity with Hamas are issues that have an important bearing on US policy in the region.

It is obvious that the US cannot isolate Iran. Obama would surely know that for the past many years both the US and UK have been spending hundreds of millions to destabilise Iran. That policy must end for it only discredits the ‘liberal’ forces in Iran.

Instead, Washington has to deal with the regime as it is, notwithstanding its dislike for its domestic policies. Greater interaction with Tehran, both bilaterally and multilaterally, is likely to be more productive for both sides, rather than efforts to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs.

Russia and China too, have a major stake in what happens in Iran. This explains their guarded and circumspect comments. In fact, Russia was the first to recognise Ahmadinejad’s re-election, even though Moscow could gain from the expected oil price hike should turmoil in Iran persist.

Moscow also knows that the Iranians have the capacity to foment some instability inside Russia. China, too, has a major interest in Iran’s continued stability, especially after its involvement in that country’s energy sector. In any case, neither have any qualms about the regime’s credentials.

The authoritarian Arab states find themselves in a quandary. While no admirers of the Islamic regime, they cannot rejoice in its predicament. The protests, should they succeed, could create a dangerous precedent that would deeply unnerve them.

While Pakistan’s strategic understanding with Iran is not tied to anyone, there is no doubt that with the regime engulfed in domestic turmoil, its ability to play an assertive role in the region is likely to be reduced as it concentrates on reinforcing itself at home. Pakistan needs to closely monitor developments in Iran and scrupulously refrain from doing anything itself or permitting its ‘friends’ to use Pakistani territory to destabilise Iran. (a-22)