North Korea and weapons of mass destruction: A Primer

SUNDAY, JUNE 7, 2009

by Biodun Iginla, BBC News Analyst, London

(Disclosure: I helped write this article for wikipedia, from which this is adapted.)

This article may need to be updated. Please update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information, and remove this template when finished. Please see the talk pagefor more information. (May 2009) North Korea First nuclear weapon test 9 October 2006 Total tests 2 Current stockpile 6-8 Nuclear Weapons?[1] Maximum missile range 2500 km (Taepodong-1) NPT signatory No Weapons of
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North Korea has an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, including claims to possess nuclear weapons. However, the CIA asserts that it also has a substantial arsenal of chemical weapons. North Korea was a member of theNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but withdrew in 2003, citing the failure of theUnited States to fulfill its end of the Agreed Framework, a 1994 agreement between the states to limit North Korea's nuclear ambitions, begin normalization of relations, and help North Korea supply some energy needs through nuclear reactors.

On October 9, 2006, the North Korean government issued an announcement that it had successfully conducted a nuclear test for the first time. Both theUnited States Geological Surveyand Japanese seismological authorities detected an earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 4.2 in North Korea, corroborating some aspects of the North Korean claims.[2]

In April 2009, reports surfaced that North Korea has become a "fully fledged nuclear power", an opinion shared by IAEA Director GeneralMohamed ElBaradei.[3]On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted another nuclear test, which is believed to have been the cause of a magnitude 4.7 seismic event.[4] Although there is no official information about the test’s location it is believed that it happened in the North-eastern region near Kilju - the site of North Korea's first nuclear test. [5]

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[EDIT]NUCLEAR WEAPONS

[edit]Background

Korea has been a divided country since 1945, when it was liberated from the defeated Japan after World War II. The Korean War was fought from June 25, 1950 until a ceasefire was signed on July 27, 1953. However, sinceNorth Korea and South Korea have still not officially made peace, strictly speaking, the war has yet to officially end.

Tensions between North and South have run high on numerous occasions since 1953. The deployment of theU.S. Army's Second Infantry Division on the Korean peninsula and the American military presence at the Korean Demilitarized Zone are publicly regarded by North Korea as an occupying army. In several areas, North Korean and American/South Korean forces operate in extreme proximity to the border, adding to tension. This tension led to the border clash in 1976, which has become known as the Axe Murder Incident.

According to newly declassified documents from the archives of former communist allies of North Korea, Pyongyang first began to pursue nuclear technology as early as 1956. In the early 1960s security concerns in the region and an apparent Soviet dismissal of these concerns hastened the DPRK’s efforts to acquire the technology to produce nuclear weapons. In the wake of the student-led April 19 movement in 1960 that overthrew Rhee Syngman and the May 16, 1961 military coup d'état that brought General Park Chung-hee to power, North Korea sought a mutual defense treaty with theSoviet Union and China.

Yet, Soviet leaders reportedly did not even consider such a pact necessary, despite the military posture of the anti-communist Park Jung-hee regime, as long as the Soviets improved relations with the United States.[6]

Perhaps the two most important factors in North Korea’s attempts to obtain nuclear weapons and become militarily self-reliant were theCuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 and the prospect of a US-Japan-ROK alliance following the 1965 establishment of diplomatic relations between the ROK and Japan. Kim Il Sung reportedly did not trust that the Soviets would live up to the conditions of the mutual defense pact and guarantee North Korea’s security since they betrayed Castro by withdrawing nuclear missiles in an effort to improve relations with the United States. Indeed, as a North Korean official explained to Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin in 1965, “the Korean leaders were distrustful of the CPSU and the Soviet government, they could not count on that the Soviet government would keep the obligations related to the defense of Korea it assumed in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Kim Il said, and therefore they were compelled to keep an army of 700,000 and a police force of 200,000.” In explaining the cause of such mistrust, the official claimed that “the Soviet Union had betrayed Cuba at the time of the Caribbean crisis.”[7]The prospect of a US-Japan-ROK alliance in 1965 further compelled the North Korean leaders to obtain nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Yet, as recently declassified Russian, Hungarian, and East Germanmaterials confirm, no communist governments were willing to share the technology with the North Koreans, out of fear that they would share the technology with China.[8]

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korean leaders recognized the need for a new security relationship with a major power since Pyongyang could not afford to maintain its military posture. North Korean leaders therefore sought to forge a new relationship with the United States, the only power strong enough to step into the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. From the early 1990s, throughout the first nuclear crisis, North Korea sought a non-aggression pact with the United States.

The U.S. rejected North Korean calls for bilateral talks concerning anon-aggression pact, and stated that only six-party talks that also include the People's Republic of China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea are acceptable. The American stance was that North Korea has violated prior bilateral agreements, thus such forums lacked accountability. Conversely, North Korea refused to speak in the context of six-party talks, stating that it would only accept bilateral talks with the United States. This led to a diplomatic stalemate.

On November 19 2006 North Korea’s Minju Joson newspaper accused South Korea of building up arms in order to attack the country, claiming that "the South Korean military is openly clamoring that the development and introduction of new weapons are to target the North." Pyongyang accused South Korea of conspiring with the United States to attack the isolated and impoverished state, an accusation made frequently by the North and routinely denied by the U.S.[9]

On the 25th May 2009 N. Korea conducted a second test of nuclear weapons at the same location as the original test (not confirmed). The test weapon was of the same magnitude as the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in the 2nd World War, (confirmed S. Korea and Russia). At the same time of the test N. Korea tested 2 short range missiles (reported a S. Korean News Network- not officially confirmed).

[edit]Chronology of events Main article: North Korea Nuclear Program Chronology

[edit]Plutonium 5 MWe experimental reactor at Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center

North Korea has had two operating reactors, both located at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. The older reactor is a Russian supplied IRT-2000 reactor completed in 1967. Uranium irradiated in this reactor was used in North Korea's first plutonium separation experiments in 1975. Nevertheless, the primary purpose of the reactor is not to produce plutonium and North Korea has had trouble acquiring enough fuel for constant operation. As such only a maximum of 4 kg of plutonium (enough for 2/3 of a weapon) could have been produced in the IRT reactor with the likely amount being less than 2 kg.[citation needed]

North Korea's main reactor, where practically all of its plutonium has been produced, is a 5MWe gas-graphite moderated Magnox type reactor. A full core consists of 8,000 fuel rods and can yield a maximum of 27–29 kg of plutonium if left in the reactor for optimal burnup.[citation needed] Often, North Korea has unloaded the reactor before reaching the maximum burnup level. There are three known cores which were unloaded in 1994 (under IAEA supervision in accordance with the Agreed Framework), 2005, and 2007. A secret core, Core 0, may have been unloaded between 1989 and 1990 and verification is needed to confirm North Korean claims that such an unloading or partial unloading did not take place.[citation needed] Under normal operation, the reactor can produce about 6 kg of plutonium per year although the reactor would need to be shut down and the fuel rods extracted to begin the plutonium separation process. Hence, plutonium separation takes place in campaigns. Reprocessing (also known as separation) is known to have taken place in 2003 for the first core and 2005 for the second core. The reprocessing of the third core was halted by the six party talks and resumption will be delayed due to the disablement efforts.[citation needed]

North Korea also had two additional graphite moderated reactors being built, but that have since become unsalvageable since maintenance of their construction sites was not allowed under the Agreed Framework. The first of these two partially constructed reactors was also in theYongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. It was to be 50MWeand able to produce 60 kg of plutonium per year, enough for approximately 10 weapons. The second partially constructed reactor was in nearby Taechon. It was to be 200 MWe and able to produce roughly 240 kg of plutonium annually, enough for approximately 40 weapons

On March 12, 1993, North Korea said that it planned to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and refused to allow inspectors access to its nuclear sites. By 1994, theUnited Statesbelieved that North Korea had enough reprocessed plutonium to produce about 10 bombs with the amount of plutonium increasing. Faced with diplomatic pressure and the threat of American military air strikes against the reactor, North Korea agreed to dismantle its plutonium program as part of the Agreed Framework in which South Korea and the United States would provide North Korea with light water reactors and fuel oil until those reactors could be completed. Because the light water reactors would require enriched uranium to be imported from outside North Korea, the amount of reactor fuel and waste could be more easily tracked, making it more difficult to divert nuclear waste to be reprocessed into plutonium. However, with bureaucratic red tape and political obstacles from the North Korea, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), established to advance the implementation of the Agreed Framework, had failed to build the promised light water reactors because the United States failed to uphold their end of the agreement by providing energy aid, and in late 2002, North Korea returned to using its old reactors.

[edit]Enriched uranium

With the abandonment of its plutonium program, U.S. officials claimed North Korea began an enriched uranium program.Pakistan, through Abdul Qadeer Khan, supplied key technology and information to North Korea in exchange for missile technology around 1997, according to U.S. intelligence officials. Pakistani President Pervez Musharaf acknowledged in 2005 that Khan had provided centrifuges and their designs to North Korea.[10] On May 30, 2008, ABC News reported that Khan, who previously confessed to his involvement with Iran and North Korea, now denies involvement with the spread of nuclear arms to those countries. He claimed in an interview with ABC News that the Pakistani government and President Pervez Musharraf forced him to be a "scapegoat" for the "national interest." He also denied ever traveling to Iran or Libya, and claimed that North Korea's nuclear program was well advanced before his visit.[11]

This program was publicized in October 2002 when the United States asked North Korean officials about the program.[12] Under the Agreed Framework North Korea explicitly agreed to freeze plutonium programs (specifically, its "graphite moderated reactors and related facilities." The agreement also committed North Korea to implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in which both Koreas committed not to have enrichment or reprocessing facilities. The United States argued North Korea violated its commitment not to have enrichment facilities.

In December 2002, the United States persuaded the KEDO Board to suspend fuel oil shipments, which led to the end of the Agreed Framework. North Korea responded by announcing plans to reactivate a dormant nuclear fuel processing program and power plant north of Pyongyang. North Korea soon thereafter expelled United Nations inspectors and withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In 2007 reports emanating from Washington suggested that the 2002CIA reports that North Korea was developing uranium enrichment technology had overstated or misread the intelligence. U.S. officials were no longer making this a major issue in the six-party talks.[13][14][15]

[edit]North Korea-United States relations Main article: North Korea – United States relations

Even though U.S. President George W. Bush had named North Korea as part of an "Axis of Evil" following the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S. officials stated that the United States was not planning any immediate military action.

According to John Feffer, co-director of the think tank Foreign Policy in Focus,

The primary problem is that the current U.S. administration fundamentally doesn’t want an agreement with North Korea. The Bush administration considers the 1994 Agreed Framework to have been a flawed agreement. It doesn’t want be saddled with a similar agreement, for if it did sign one, it would then be open to charges of "appeasing" Pyongyang. The Vice President has summed up the approach as: "We don’t negotiate with evil, we defeat evil."[16]

American ire at North Korea is further inflamed by allegations of state-sponsored drug smuggling, money laundering, and wide-scalecounterfeiting.

Diplomatic efforts at resolving the North Korean situation are complicated by the different goals and interests of the nations of the region. While none of the parties desire a North Korea with nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea are especially concerned about North Korean counter-strikes following possible military action against North Korea. The People's Republic of China and South Korea are also very worried about the economic and social consequences should this situation cause the North Korean government to collapse.

In early 2000 the Zurich-based company ABB[17][18] was awarded the contract to provide the design and key components for two light-water nuclear reactors to North Korea.[19]

[edit]Nuclear deterrence This articlemay requirecleanup to meet Wikipedia'squality standards.Pleaseimprove this article if you can. (July 2008)

Former South Korean Government sources, as well as some scholars and analysts, have argued that North Korea is using nuclear weapons primarily as a political tool to begin re-establishing normal relations with the U.S., Japan and South Korea, and to end the long-standing economic embargo against North Korea. They point out that the threat of nuclear weapons is the only thing that has brought the U.S., Japan and South Korea into serious negotiations. In a lecture in 1993, Bruce Cumings asserted that based on information gathered by the CIA, the activity around the Yongbyon facility may have been done expressly to draw the attention of U.S. satellites. He also pointed out that the CIA had not claimed North Korea had nuclear weapons, but that they had enough material to create such weapons should they choose to do so.

Further to this argument is the observation that many parties have a vested interest in the claim that North Korea has nuclear weapons. For North Korea, it has been a bargaining tool for opening diplomatic discussions. The nuclear development programme can be manipulated in exchange for foreign aid. Nuclear posturing has also been seen as a threat that could force the re-unification of the Korean peninsula. TheGrand National Party, currently the ruling party in South Korea, have stated that they will not return to the Sunshine policy before North Korea gives up their nuclear weapons. South Korean newspapers have warned that North Korea's nuclear arsenal could destroy South Korea's conventional forces, and that the strategic military balance has irrevocably shifted in the aftermath of North Korea's nuclear test. Finally, the threat of a nuclear-armed North Korea has fed South Korea's perceived need for a larger standing army and defence force.

Some LDP politicians in Japan have openly expressed a desire to change Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, whic