Al-Saud Mafia-House: Saudi-Qatari Political-Adultery-Relationship
Pharaoh Salman bin Abdel Aziz,
At the outset of this article I would like to stress, value and emphasize - as a Sunni married to a Shi’a woman – my ardent and unequivocal support and backing to Shi’a’s acquiring their complete rights – not only in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the rest of the GCC countries; this is the way I was brought-up by my parents, may God have mercy on their souls, and is what I am teaching my kids: We are all Muslims. I recall in a privileged meeting that I had with the late Ayatollah Mohammad Hussein Fadllah, may God have mercy on his Soul, the stunning revelation conveyed to me: “We must educate the Shi’as with the Sunni books and we must educate the Sunnis with the Shi’a books.” This significant similarity, correspondence, matching, parallelism, interdependence, interrelationship and interconnection - too closely correlated to be attributed to chance and therefore indicating a systematic relation - ideological stand of mine was (is) one of the main reasons why, fifty years ago, was the outset of my being considered - by the Saudi Pharaoh - a “Dissident”. One of my articles: “Why I became A Saudi Dissident”http://www.allvoices.com/contributednews
Although from 1971 to the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia was the de facto protector of Qatar and while Qatar was technically an autonomous, sovereign nation, in reality its leadership repeatedly looked towards Saudi Arabia for policy direction; however, the high and low tide rapprochement and the “love and hate” relationship were and are the only two possible functional Saudi-Qatari relation’s “highways.” Besides, the Qatari regime, known for its “political embezzlement stands” and opposing Saudi policy and consentient, keeps courting Iran openly; to mini-Qatar the crux of the issue is that it is forced to deal with Iran in a fundamentally different way to Saudi Arabia. Sharing the world’s largest gas field with Iran and as a small country with no strategic depth, Qatar sensibly chooses not to goad the Iranians. The level of Saudi Arabia’s bellicosity in retaliation against perceived Iranian interference in Bahrain puts this Qatari policy in jeopardy. For Saudi Arabia in this war-like frame of mind a Qatar that fraternizes with Iran, potentially undermining GCC unity against this nominally shared enemy, is a liability. Yet Qatar finds itself between a rock and a hard place. In reality a severely angered Saudi Arabia could be highly damaging - even deadly - for Qatar. One of my articles: Al-Saud Mafia-House: Saudi Arabia’s Explosion & the Gulf’s Implosionhttp://www.allvoices.com/contributed-new
During its decade of cold relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar warmed up to Syria, the leader of the so-called resistance axis in Arab politics. In contrast to today’s stand, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani were frequent visitors to each other's countries, and Qatari investors poured billions of dollars into the struggling Syrian economy. Both states, along with Iran,, and Hamas, were seen as a regional counterbalance to the pro-Western axis of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. (The Saudis made their displeasure with Qatar's maverick policies clear on a number of occasions. Saudi Arabia, along with Egypt, refused to attend a January 2009 summit in Qatar supported by Syria and Hamas and instead held another summit in Riyadh just one day before.)
It was in the 1990’s that this unfriendly relationship began to show a marked deterioration. Firstly, Qatar’s then-Crown Prince, Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani, appeared to chafe under Saudi suzerainty and aspired to take his country on to a firmly independent trajectory, eschewing Saudi Arabia’s overarching leadership. One of my articles: House of Saud Colonizing the Arab Gulf Countries http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-new
Secondly, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia and its eastern oil fields, Saudi Arabia’s scramble to invite in Western coalition forces to defend its Kingdom made it abundantly clear their own armed forces were not sufficient even to protect themselves. In preparation for the coming American action in the Gulf, Qatar signed military agreements with the US in 1991-2 allowing American forces to base themselves in Qatar. The need for any kind of Saudi protection promptly vanished. all the while with both countries vying for the mantle of ‘leader of the Arab World’, a prize of central importance to their basic ruling bargains.
The “Qatari-jewish” Pharaoh, after obtaining US blessings, in a stormy region and before Mubarrak’s speedy downfall, established diplomatic relations with “israel”– in order to downplay Qatar’s Saudi dependency, or any other form of other aggression and to enhancing and upgrading its long-term Gas economic revenues - subscribed to an additional US-“israel” “Military Insurance Policy”; Qatar’s normal-awkward step aimed also to sending different messages, regionally and internationally, that Qatar is well protected and is an investment safe-haven; slaves to their materialistic impulses and quests; today, Qatar’s despotic regime finds out that it has outsmarted and double-crossed itself while being in a very vulnerable and difficult to defend prestidigitator’s position. One of my articles: House of Saud’s Oil Revenues, Governing and the Upcoming ‘Revolution’ http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-new
If Riyadh continues to view Doha’s elite as a liability and begins to isolate Qatar where possible, aside from the potentially practical implications for Qatar, there are potentially serious ramifications for Qatar’s international role. Thus far in the Arab Spring with Qatar to the fore but with Saudi Arabia often supporting its moves from the rear, these two states have operated successfully. A Qatari policy without the Saudi Arabian clout and backing is liable to be significantly weaker. In this revolutionary age, if Qatar’s role is hampered without Saudi’s support, then this leaves the region without a state willing to push the boundaries of regional politics, which could herald a return to greater Arab passivity and studied ignorance of the violence taking place in their midst.
In the spring of 2006, Qatar's then energy minister broke his silence on a stalled, multibillion-dollar project to supply Qatari gas to Kuwait. "We have received no clearance from Saudi Arabia" he said. "Hence it is not feasible." The roller-coaster-like diplomatic relations between the two energy-rich neighbors dates back to 1992, when a border clash caused the death of two guards. Relations went downhill from there.
Saudi Arabia's then crown prince, Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, boycotted a summit of Islamic states in Qatar in 2000 to protest the presence to the Israeli trade office in Doha. Riyadh then withdrew its ambassador to Qatar in 2002 following controversial comments made by Saudi dissidents on Qatar's Al Jazeera satellite channel.
Wishing to put an end to the bad blood, Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani, widely seen as the shrewd architect of Qatar's foreign policy, accompanied the emir on a surprise visit to Riyadh in September 2007. Relations quickly improved following that visit, with the Saudi monarch attending the Gulf Cooperation Council summit in Doha that December. By next March, the new Saudi crown prince, Sultan, had paid a three-day visit to Doha, the first since 2002. In July 2008, the Saudis played host to a high-level summit in Jeddah that saw the two neighbors demarcate their border and set up a joint council to be chaired by both states' crown princes - who are more than 50 years apart in age - to strengthen political, security, financial, economic, commercial, investment, cultural, and media relations.
When the Qatari emir had taken the chairman and general manager of Al Jazeera with him to Riyadh in September 2007 who confessed: "Orders were given not to tackle any Saudi issue without referring to the higher management" and that subsequently "All dissident voices disappeared from our screens."
Deadly ups and downs is a constant landmark of the Saudi-Qatari Political-Adultery-Relationship; when also taking into account the undemocratic, unconstitutional, unethical, ungraceful, unmannered, unabashed, undisguised, unapologetic and treacherouse characters and behavior of the different Saudi-Qatari Pharaohs involved, I am more than convinced that now – while I am writing this article – each of the Saudi-Qatari regimes is engaged in preparing the “poisinouse potion” to serve his hated perfidious, false, fickle, disloyal, inconstant, faithless, recreant, treacherous, renegade, turncoat and unfaithful “Mortal- Gulf-Enemy.”
Previous related articles of mine: 1. “Why I became A Saudi Dissident” http://www.allvoices.com/contributednews
Dr. Walid Amin Ruwayha
Your Saudi “Dissident” Paris Neighbor